

Detecting money laundering transactions with machine learning

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Aug 26th 2020


Money laundering

- Making money from criminal activity appear legal
- Examples
 - Buy antics with dirty money – state as attic finding – sell legally
 - Incorporate criminal funds in your own legal business



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- ▶ All financial institutions are legally binded to report “suspicious transactions” to Økokrim

Why is AML important



REUTERS

BUSINESS NEWS

MARCH 19, 2020 / 8:14 PM / 5 MONTHS AGO

**Swedbank hit with record \$386 million fine
over Baltic money-laundering breaches**

Why is AML important

 **REUTERS**
BUSINESS NEWS

MARCH 19, 2020 / 8:14 PM / 5 MONTHS AGO

**Swedbank hit with
over \$1 billion fine**

FINANCE FORTUNE
A Money-Laundering Mega-Scandal Has Forced the CEO of Denmark's Biggest Bank to Resign

Why is AML important

 **REUTERS**
BUSINESS NEWS

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Sweden hit with
The Guardian
over E

Standard Chartered fined \$1.1bn for
money-laundering and sanctions
breaches

FINANCE


FORTUNE

A Money-Laundering
Scandal
of De-

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st Bank

Current AML process at DNB




Weaknesses

- Many false positive alerts – much manual work
- Too simplistic – Money launderers are more sophisticated

What we did

All transactions




Legitimate

Money
Laundering
(sent to
ØKOKRIM)

- Replace the AML-system with a machine learning model
- Available data types:
 - transaction history
 - customer data
 - alerts
 - manually inspected cases


What we did

More realistic setting!




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What makes this hard?



Modelling


- Binary response (Y): Transaction sent to Økokrim (Yes = 1, no = 0)
- Want to predict $P(Y = 1 | \text{data related to present transaction})$
- State of the art: **Gradient boosting machines (GBM)**
- **XGBoost** – very efficient and flexible implementation of GBM based on tree models
 - **Requires tabular data input (features)**



Transforming raw data (feature engineering)

Input data types

- Specific transaction info
- Background info about sender/receiver
- Sender/receiver's transaction history
- Previously reported transactions from sender/receiver



Y	X1	X2	X3	X4	X5	X6
1	0,453406	0,992838	0,734389	0,159918	0,397515	0,949952
0	0,274	0,654207	0,169886	0,493841	0,407112	0,939789
0	0,741897	0,855005	0,585788	0,366456	0,365123	0,57955
1	0,488119	0,465754	0,716517	0,493048	0,855049	0,632114
0	0,134458	0,762057	0,848194	0,098779	0,872603	0,063026
0	0,531914	0,998817	0,808215	0,060721	0,716595	0,35374
0	0,341509	0,8398	0,637808	0,48304	0,279987	0,730286
0	0,530306	0,463271	0,338713	0,986781	0,925251	0,272484
1	0,864123	0,652763	0,689599	0,080937	0,990294	0,364736
0	0,106812	0,900351	0,450224	0,143815	0,593244	0,020764

1716 columns (features)


Data refinement

2 years of modellable transaction data

- All transactions leading to
 - A report (C)
 - An alert, but no report (B)
- A sample of normal transactions (A)

Data refinement

- We chose $\#A = \#B$
- Use only one transaction from each manual investigation (2)
- No transactions with same sender/receiver two consecutive days




Training, testing and modelling

Modelling

- 10-fold cross validation (CV)
- Stopping criterion (# boosting rounds): AUC
- Tuning: Random + iterative grid-search
- Model trained on GPU
- Final model used for prediction on test data:


$$\hat{f}(x_{\text{test}}) = \frac{1}{10} \sum_{i=1}^{10} \hat{f}_{\text{CV},-i}(x_{\text{test}})$$

Out-of-time testing




2 training scenarios

All data types



No unreported transactions



Evaluation metrics

Ranking:

AUC

Probabilities:


Brier score

Comparing scenarios

	All data types	No unreported transactions
AUC	0.907	0.852
Brier	0.025	0.340


Much better!

Money laundering transactions



ML vs current AML system

- Hard to properly compare
- **PPP = Proportion of Positive Predictions:**
Proportion of transactions that needs to be controlled to find 95% of the reported transactions




	ML (all data types)	Current system
PPP	31.5 %	48.9 %

Limitations

- We are not really using the **time-evolving transaction network**
 - **Who** are you sending/receiving money to/from
 - **When** are you sending/receiving
- Social/professional network information is not used
- Many variables – complicates putting the model into production
- The model only learns “known” what has already been reported

Further work

- To a greater extent utilize the transaction network
 - Methodology stemming from NLP (word2vec)
 - Training embeddings (numerical vectors) with neural networks to represent the transaction network for each customer
- Resources at DNB are working on utilizing customer's professional role network (Brønnøysundregisteret)



BigInsight